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CoMpLETIoN oF BASEL III poST-CRISIS REFoRMS: oVERVIEw  
AND ANALySIS oF kEy FEATuRES
in december 2017, the Basel Committee published the final revisions to the Basel iii 
regulatory framework. the main objective of these revisions – the outstanding Basel iii post-
crisis reforms – was to reduce the excessive variability of risk-weighted assets. to further 
this purpose, a number of extensive changes were introduced to the existing regulatory 
standards, including the two available approaches for credit risk (the standardised approach 
and the internal ratings-based approach), the operational risk framework, the credit valuation 
adjustment framework, and the leverage ratio, among others. in addition, a more robust, 
risk-sensitive aggregate output floor based on the revised standardised approaches was 
added to the framework. in parallel, the Basel Committee completed its review of the 
regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures without changes to the current rules at this 
stage. this paper provides a general overview of all these developments along with more 
detailed explanations of their key features, rationale and workings.   
the Basel framework is a central international standard in the regulation and 
supervision of banks. these standards include a broad variety of elements such as 
minimum capital requirements, supervisory guidelines and disclosure requirements, 
among others. the international financial crisis of 2007-09 revealed a number of 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities which have severely affected the stability of most 
financial systems around the globe. in the face of this, the international reaction was 
to launch a series of initiatives aimed at tackling the problems identified. these 
responses included an extensive reform of the global standards on financial regulation 
and supervision. 
the general outline of the reforms was shaped at the first summit of the G20 leaders in 
washington in november 2008, with more details being added following the second 
summit held in london in april 2009. the reforms covered three key areas. first, 
changes to prudential banking regulation involving revisions to microprudential 
requirements and the development of new macroprudential instruments. second, 
other regulatory reforms such as harmonising international accounting standards, and 
improving regulation and monitoring of non-banking sectors. finally, a new institutional 
framework for the international coordination of financial regulation was developed. 
this framework included regular annual G20 meetings and the creation of the financial 
stability Board as the successor to the financial stability forum.
in accordance with the G20 mandate, the Basel Committee on Banking supervision 
(BCBs) was in charge of developing those reforms necessary for the strengthening 
of the global regulatory and supervisory standards for banks. the key objectives 
guiding the reforms of the existing standards (‘Basel ii’) were two-fold: to increase 
the resilience of the financial system and to reduce the impact of the financial crisis 
on the economy.
the reforms were developed gradually over a period of years. the first steps were taken in 
2009 with several measures regarding the treatment of banks’ trading book exposures, 
securitisations and re-securitisations. the bulk of the reforms of the Basel standards, 
however, began in 2010 and 2011, with the publication of Basel iii, and was finalized in a 
second phase and published in 2017. 
Abstract 
1 Introduction
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the first stage of the reforms was focused on increasing minimum capital requirements 
and setting up adequate capital ‘buffers’ (to be used in stressed periods), while also 
improving the definition and quality of regulatory capital (i.e. the numerator of the 
existing capital ratios). simultaneously, a minimum leverage ratio requirement was 
outlined and new standards were set out on large exposures limits and on liquidity risk 
(a short-term minimum ratio and a complementary medium-term ratio). in addition, the 
standards for market risk,1 counterparty credit risk and securitisation were also revised. 
finally, for the first time since the creation of the Basel standards, new macroprudential 
elements (for the treatment of systemically important financial institutions and to 
address systemic risks stemming from excessive credit growth) were included as part 
of the framework.
in the second stage, following the aforementioned reforms, the focus of the Basel work 
turned to one other key aspect revealed by the crisis: the calculation of risk-weighted 
assets (rwas), the denominator of the minimum capital ratios in the Basel standards. 
this was also a response to the shortcomings identified during the financial crisis 
regarding the existing architecture of the regulatory framework. supported by its own 
analysis and the views of a broad range of stakeholders, the BCBs recognised the 
need to improve the standards in three dimensions: risk sensitivity, simplicity and 
comparability [BCBs (2015b and 2013a)]. striking the right balance between these 
dimensions was an important challenge underlying most of the revisions being 
envisaged. 
in addition, a key motivation for this second wave of reforms – also known as the ‘finalisation 
of Basel iii post-crisis regulatory reforms’ – was to restore the credibility, brought into 
question during the crisis, of banks’ capital ratios. evidence from the recent crisis 
suggested that the observed variation in rwas might not entirely reflect actual differences 
in banks’ risk-taking [see for example Bank of england (2011)]. it also aimed to improve 
comparability between capital ratios of different banks. additionally, it was decided that 
the revisions to this end should be carried out without significantly increasing overall 
capital requirements.
the completion of the Basel iii post-crisis reforms involved several areas of the Basel 
standards and a broad range of regulatory measures, including restrictions on the 
use of internal models and enhancements to the robustness and risk sensitivity of 
the existing standardised approaches. in particular, the two available approaches for 
credit risk, the standardised approach (sa) and the approach based on internal 
models (the internal rating based approach, irB) were subject to extensive revisions. 
in addition, substantial changes and recalibrations were proposed to the operational 
risk framework along with other revisions to the framework for credit valuation 
adjustment (Cva) and to the leverage ratio, among others. among all these revisions, 
a key element of the Basel iii post-crisis reforms was also put forward: an aggregate 
output floor to limit the benefits that banks can derive from using internal models to 
calculate minimum capital requirements. this ‘output floor’ replaced the existing 
floor in the Basel ii standards with a more robust, risk-sensitive design based on the 
revised standardised approaches. 
1 in January 2016 the Basel Committee published the new standard for market risk, known as the fundamental 
review of the trading Book. 
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on 7 december 2017, following a period of intense work and discussions, the finalisation 
of the Basel iii post-crisis reforms was endorsed by the Group of Central Bank Governors 
and Heads of supervision (GHos), the BCBs’s oversight body [BCBs (2017a)]. in this 
manner, the agreed raft of measures broadly concluded the large-scale set of reforms 
initiated in response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
at the same time as the Basel iii reforms were announced and the revised standards were 
published, the Basel Committee also produced a discussion paper (dp) on the regulatory 
treatment of sovereign exposures [BCBs (2017b)]. the dp noted that at that stage the 
Basel Committee had not reached a consensus to make any changes to the current 
treatment of sovereign exposures. 
against this background, the purpose of this paper is to introduce the recently announced 
post-crisis reforms of Basel iii and to explain their main rationale and workings. to this 
end, the paper is organised as follows. first, it describes the main revisions introduced to 
the credit risk (section 2) and operational risk (section 3) frameworks. section 4 describes 
other revisions which include the Cva framework and the leverage ratio. next, section 5 
analyses the output floor and other backstop measures adopted. section 7 introduces the 
agreed timeline for the implementation of the revised standards finally, section 6 briefly 
describes the Basel Committee’s work regarding the regulatory treatment of sovereign 
exposures and section 8 concludes by describing the next steps in the Basel Committee’s 
agenda.
Credit risk generally constitutes the largest part of banks’ capital requirements and 
is a primary source of variations in risk-weighted assets (rwas) – the denominator of 
the capital ratio. in line with the overall objectives of the reforms, the Basel Committee 
introduced revisions to the two available approaches for the treatment of credit risk 
in the Basel standards: the standardised approach for credit risk (sa) and the 
approach based on banks’ internal models (the internal ratings based approach or 
irB). 
the general objectives of the revisions to the sa were: i) to enhance risk sensitivity by 
introducing better risk drivers and further granularity to reflect risks more accurately; ii) to 
reduce excessive reliance on external credit ratings (as mandated by the fsB),2 and iii) to 
improve risks assessments by providing specific treatments of certain portfolios.3
this review is especially important since the sa is widely used by entities across jurisdictions 
and will be the basis for the calculation of the new output floor (see section 5).4 in this 
regard, the comparability of capital requirements under the sa and the irB has also been 
enhanced by aligning their definitions and taxonomy whenever possible.
the changes introduced can be separated by the different portfolios covered in the credit 
risk framework, namely: exposures to banks, corporates, specialised lending, equity, real 
estate and other retail.
2 Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings [fsB (2010)].
3 BCBs (2016d). 
4 BCBs (2014a), Capital floors: the design of a framework based on standardised approaches.
2  Credit risk: the 
standardised approach 
and the internal 
ratings-based 
approach
2.1  reforms of tHe 
standardised approaCH
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regarding exposures to banks, the revised framework introduces two options based on 
whether the claims on banks are rated or not. Both methods require banks to undertake a 
self-assessment of the risk through a mandatory due diligence process:5 
i) for rated exposures and for jurisdictions that allow the use of external credit 
ratings for regulatory purposes, the external credit risk assessment approach 
(eCra) assigns risk weights (rws) according to the corresponding external 
ratings (table 1). such ratings should not incorporate assumptions of implicit 
government support. also, due diligence analysis should never result in the 
application of a lower rw than that determined by the external rating. 
ii) for unrated exposures and for jurisdictions that do not allow the use of 
external ratings for regulatory purposes,6 the standardised credit risk 
assessment approach (sCra) assigns rws according to three grades based 
on the counterparty’s creditworthiness and the level of compliance with the 
Basel regulatory minimum requirements, including capital buffers but 
excluding liquidity risk requirements (table 2). the risk-weighted treatment for 
unrated exposures is more granular than the existing flat risk weight. 
another enhancement to the risk sensitivity of the framework is the development of a 
specific treatment for covered bonds exposures.
5 Banks have to perform due diligence to ensure that they have an adequate understanding, at origination and 
thereafter on a regular basis (at least annually), of the risk profile and characteristics of their counterparties. 
Banks should take reasonable and adequate steps to assess the operating and financial performance levels and 
trends through internal credit analysis and/or other analytics outsourced to a third party, as appropriate for each 
counterparty.
6 in particular, the united states do not allow the use of credit ratings in banking regulation.
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a).
RWs in jurisdictions 
where the ratings 
approach is permitted
AAA to AA– A+ to A– BBB+ to BBB– BB+ to BB– Below B–
050302WR 100 150
RW short-term exposures 20 20 20 50 150
EXTERNAL CREDIT RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH (ECRA): 
RWS FOR BANK EXPOSURES (%)
TABLE 1
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a).
a Under the SCRA, exposures to banks without an external credit rating may receive a risk weight of 30%, provided 
that the counterparty bank has a CET1 ratio which meets or exceeds 14% and a Tier 1 leverage ratio which meets 
or exceeds 5%. The counterparty bank must also satisfy all the requirements for Grade A classification.
RWs where the ratings approach is not 
permitted and for unrated exposures
Grade A Grade B Grade C
05157)a( 04WR
0510502serusopxe mret-trohs WR
STANDARDISED CREDIT RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH (SCRA):  
RWS FOR BANK EXPOSURES (%)
TABLE 2
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the Committee also tried to limit the use of external ratings for the treatment of exposures 
to corporates. However, to develop a standardised risk weighting methodology completely 
independent of external ratings was found to be particularly difficult. this was due to the 
material differences identified in business models and accounting practices, in addition to 
specific industry factors in different jurisdictions. Given the various limitations in place and 
the objectives of the reforms, the Committee agreed to maintain references to external 
ratings where available and/or possible, but required their use to be complemented with 
banks’ mandatory due diligence processes. in addition, the granularity of the rws for 
rated exposures was also increased. for corporate exposures of banks in jurisdictions 
where the use of external ratings for regulatory purposes is not allowed, banks have to 
assign a 100% risk weight to all corporate exposures, with the exception of those identified 
as ‘investment grade’.7
for specialised lending (i.e. exposures to project finance, object finance and commodities 
finance) a standalone treatment was proposed. in this approach, a rw will be assigned 
based on the type of specialised lending category and the use or not of external ratings. if 
there is a rating available and permitted, the treatment is as for general corporates. if a 
rating is not available or is not permitted, the rws for project finance are 130% for the 
operational phase and 100% for the pre-operational phase, except for high quality project 
finance exposures that are risk-weighted at 80%.8 for object and commodity finance there 
is a single rw of 100%.
previous to the reforms, there was no standalone regulatory treatment for equity 
exposures and they received a flat 100% rw. the revised sa has introduced a specific 
category for equity exposures risk-weighted at 250%, a 400% rw for speculative 
unlisted equity exposures and a rw of 150% for subordinated debt. in addition, equity 
exposures are defined on the basis of the economic substance of the instrument and 
according to the criteria prescribed in the irB framework. the new rws for equity 
exposures (and the prohibition on the use of the irB approach for these exposures, see 
section 2.2) should be introduced progressively with a five-year linear phase-in from 
January 2022. 
regarding real estate exposures, a fundamental change in the framework is that all the 
exposures backed by real estate assets are now grouped under a single real estate 
category. in addition, a more risk-sensitive approach was developed: rws now vary 
according to the ltv ratio of the mortgage with more granularity (under Basel ii only two 
buckets were considered and under the revised standards they are increased to six). 
risk-sensitivity for real estate has also been enhanced by providing a differentiated 
regulatory treatment depending on whether the real estate asset is to be occupied for 
housing purposes (residential real estate, rre) or is to be used for commercial purposes 
7 an “investment grade” corporate is defined in the new standards (paragraph 42) as a “corporate entity that has 
adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments in a timely manner and its ability to do so is assessed to be 
robust against adverse changes in the economic cycle and business conditions.” additional requirements are 
also specified for banks when classifying a corporate as investment grade (banks should take into account the 
complexity of the business model, performance relative to industry and peers, and risks posed by the entity’s 
operating environment) and the corporate (or its parent company) should have securities outstanding on a 
recognised securities exchange. 
8 High quality project finance exposure refers to an exposure to a project finance entity that is able to meet its 
financial commitments in a timely manner and its ability to do so is assessed to be robust against adverse 
changes in the economic cycle and business conditions. in addition, conditions set out in paragraph 48 of the 
standardised approach for credit risk framework as part of Basel iii: finalising post-crisis reforms (2017) have to 
be met to qualify for the 80% rw.
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(commercial real estate, Cre), with the latter attracting higher rws. in the same vein, two 
different treatments within these two categories will be applied to the exposures. this has 
been based on whether servicing the loan depends materially on the cash flows generated 
by the property securing the loan (the exposure is then classified according to the income 
producing real estate treatment, ip-rre and ip-Cre and attracts higher rws) or whether 
it depends on the underlying capacity of the borrower to service the debt from other 
sources (the general treatment will be applied to the exposure). 
moreover, the new sa framework requires banks to assign in general a higher risk weight 
of 150% to credit facilities that finance the acquisition, development, or construction 
(adC) of real property. this is the highest rw in the real estate category.  Scheme 1 
provides a summary of the revised regulatory treatment for real estate exposures.
REVISED TREATMENT OF REAL ESTATE EXPOSURES (a) SCHEME 1
R
E
S
ID
E
N
T
IA
L
C
O
M
M
E
R
C
IA
L
REAL ESTATE
GENERAL TREATMENT
(repayment not materially 
dependent on cash flows 
generated by property)
INCOME PRODUCTING
REAL ESTATE
(repayment materially 
dependent on cash flows 
generated by property)
LAND ACQUISITION 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
CONSTRUCTION
RW = 150%
Residential RE
Commercial RE IP - CRE
IP - RRE
Operational 
requirements 
met
(Preferential 
treatment)
RW based 
on LTV
Operational 
requirements 
NOT met
RW
of counterparty 
Operational 
requirements 
met
RW based 
on LTV (higher 
than general RRE)
Operational 
requirements 
NOT met
RW = 150%
Operational 
requirements 
met
(Preferential 
treatment)
RW = Min (60%;
RW counterparty) 
For LTV < 60%: _
For LTV > 60%: 
RW counterparty
Operational 
requirements 
NOT met
RW
of counterparty
Operational 
requirements 
met
RW based 
on LTV (higher
than IP- RRE)
Operational 
requirements 
NOT met
RW = 150%
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2016d and 2017a).
a Operational requirements include, for example, that the property securing the exposure is fully completed (finished property), there is legal enforceability or a 
prudent valuation of the property.
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an important revision to the framework was that, subject to national discretion, banks can 
be allowed to use an alternative method – the ‘loan-splitting approach’ – to compute the 
rw for general residential and commercial real estate exposures. under the loan-splitting 
approach, banks can split a mortgage into two separate exposures: a secured exposure 
and an unsecured exposure.9 this treatment – which already existed under the european 
Capital requirements regulation (Crr) – was not considered originally in the Consultative 
document published by the Committee in 2016 (BCBs, 2016d).  
for other retail exposures, a more granular treatment was introduced. the regulatory retail 
portfolio now distinguishes between revolving facilities (where credit is typically drawn 
upon) and transactors (where the facility is used to facilitate transactions rather than a 
source of credit). 
for off-balance sheet items, the credit conversion factors (CCfs),10 which are used to 
determine the amount of an exposure to be risk-weighted, are now more risk-sensitive. 
the scope of unconditionally cancellable commitments (uCCs) (for example, credit cards 
which the bank can cancel at any time without prior notice) has been better specified by 
introducing a clearer definition of commitment. another enhancement was the introduction 
of positive CCfs for uCCs (they have been increased from 0% to 10%). a 0% CCf for 
uCCs was found inadequate since consumer protection laws, risk management capabilities 
and reputational risk considerations frequently constrain banks’ ability to cancel such 
commitments in practice.
the credit risk mitigation (CRM) framework has been considered too complex and to have 
permitted too much flexibility for banks applying the sa.11 as such, this was identified as 
a possible source of undue divergence in capital requirements across banks applying the 
sa. in consequence, the revised Crm framework removed the existing internal modelling 
approaches for the calculation of capital charges for certain exposures backed by financial 
collateral. the proposal also introduces an alternative approach which, without explicitly 
relying on external ratings, aims to limit the eligibility of financial collateral and guarantees 
to what is commonly referred to as “investment grade”. as a result, depending on whether 
external ratings are used or not in a given jurisdiction, the proposal contains two sets of 
eligibility criteria for defining financial collateral and eligible guarantors. and it also includes 
two separate tables with the supervisory haircuts applicable to each case.
the use of internal models is one of the key features of the risk-based approach followed 
in the Basel framework. during the last few years, the BCBs has performed analysis 
focused on assessing drivers of material differences in the rwas of the banking book 
calculated with internal models.12 these studies show that while a share of the variation 
9 the way to calculate loan splitting for a residential real estate exposure is to assign a 20% risk weight to the 
part of the loan representing up to 55% of the residential property’s value, and assign the remaining balance of 
the loan a risk weight based on the creditworthiness of the counterparty, as it was an unsecured exposure. for 
example, for a loan of €70,000 to an individual secured on a property valued at €100,000, the bank will apply a 
risk weight of 20% to €55,000 of the exposure and a risk weight of 75% to the residual exposure of €15,000. 
this gives total risk weighted assets for the exposure of €22,250 = (20% * €55,000) + (75% * €15,000).
10 off-balance sheet exposures are amounts committed but not drawn (including, for example, credit lines or 
guarantees). therefore, the bank does not have a direct exposure but there is a certain probability that these 
off-balance sheet exposures become direct exposures of the bank. the CCf is the regulatorily estimated 
probability of the conversion of these exposures. the CCf multiplied by the committed but undrawn amount 
gives the credit exposure equivalent for off-balance sheet items. afterwards, these credit exposure equivalents 
will be multiplied by the respective rw depending on the category or portfolio under which they are classified. 
11 the Crm framework sets requirements on Crm techniques (such as guarantees and collateral) which an 
institution must meet in order to qualify for a reduction of the capital requirements generated by exposures.
12 BCBs (2013 and 2016c).
2.2  reforms of  
tHe irB framework 
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was explained by underlying differences in the risk composition of banks’ assets, there 
was also a material amount of variability of rwas that could not be explained by risk-
based differences (i.e. fundamental risk factors such as portfolio mix or asset quality). 
other studies also arrived at similar conclusions [see for example eBa (2016) and trucharte 
et al. (2015)].
overall, most studies suggested that part of the variation in rwas could be attributable to 
‘practice-based’ drivers. these drivers include not only supervisory choices allowed under 
the framework or deviations in national implementation of the Basel framework, but also 
differences derived from banks’ choices under the irB framework e.g. bank modelling 
choices including reference data or methodological differences such as the definition of 
default or other adjustments.
 to illustrate the magnitude of this issue, a 2013 BCBs analysis on rwas for credit risk in 
the banking book found that 25% of the observed variability of rwas could not have been 
explained by the underlying differences in the risk composition of banks’ assets. this 
study was based on a hypothetical portfolio exercise comprising a subset of common 
wholesale obligors. the purpose was to identify practice-based differences in banks’ 
internal estimates of the irB parameters (e.g. pds, lGds).
in sum, the findings of these studies – further to evidence collected during the pre-crisis 
period – raised serious doubts regarding the robustness of modelling certain asset classes. 
as a result, the BCBs decided to introduce a number of changes to the available irB 
approaches for credit risk (the advanced and the foundation approach) as a central element 
of its reform programme. the measures to constrain the use of internal models would work 
in tandem with the aggregate output floor and the minimum leverage ratio requirement as 
backstop measures (section 5). 
in particular, the revisions to the irB sought to restore confidence in the accuracy of internal 
models for the calculation of rwas, as well as to improve the comparability of banks’ 
capital ratios by constraining the use of the internal models and placing limits on certain 
inputs that are used to calculate capital requirements for credit risk (‘input floors’). despite 
these revisions, the Committee was also mindful of the need to ensure that the capital 
framework remains sufficiently risk-sensitive.
a prerequisite for regulators to be able to rely confidently on banks’ internal models, is that 
the risk under consideration can be modelled. in the analysis conducted by the BCBs 
[BCBs (2013b)], the low-default nature of the portfolios assessed and the consequent lack 
of adequate data for risk parameter estimation, were found as possible factors leading to 
differences in banks’ internal estimates. in such cases, banks’ internal estimates of loss 
given default (lGd) and credit conversion factors (CCf) are likely to be scattered.13 in 
general, banks and large corporates are typical asset classes where there is insufficient 
data for reliable lGd estimates. as a result, the Committee decided to remove the 
advanced-irB approaches for exposures in these portfolios.14 implicit in this decision was 
a trade-off between the benefits of internal models to produce capital requirements that 
13 in the case of lGd and CCfs only defaulted observations are relevant for the estimation. thus, banks have less 
relevant data for modelling lGd and ead than they do for pd modelling, and the difference in data availability 
is particularly large in portfolios where defaults are infrequent.
14 under the advanced irB (airB) banks are allowed to provide internal estimates of pd (probability of default), 
lGd (loss given default), exposure at default (ead) and maturity (m). in turn, under the foundation irB (firB) 
banks are only allowed to estimate pds.
main revisions to the irB 
approach: constraints on the 
use of internal models 
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better reflect the underlying risks and the costs of a possible capital outcome that may be 
not adequate or comparable.
further to this, to improve simplicity, consistency and comparability, the Committee 
decided to remove the two irB approaches (airB and firB) for exposures to equities. 
this means that the sa is the only approach left for equities. for most equities, 
particularly publicly traded ones, it was considered unlikely that banks would have 
more or better specific knowledge on the issuer than that available in public data. if all 
banks base their risk assessments on the same data, differences in the resulting capital 
requirements may be difficult to justify. as commented above, to smooth the impact of 
these revisions the use of the irB approaches for equities will be phased out over five 
years starting in 2022.
table 3 compares the revised scope of approaches available under Basel iii for certain 
asset classes with those under the Basel ii framework. with respect to specialised lending, 
banks will be permitted to continue using the airB and the firB while the Committee 
reviews the current ‘slotting approach’ for specialised lending.15 
overall, compared to the 2016 Consultative document [BCBs (2016b)] the scope of 
approaches available in the standards agreed in december 2017 is larger. the new 
standards now allow the firB to be used for exposures to banks and large and mid-sized 
corporates, and they also allow either the airB or the firB to be used for specialised 
lending exposures.
for those risks and portfolios where internal models were allowed, the Committee has 
introduced constraints on the internal parameters that banks estimate. these constraints 
were set at the exposure level and are known as ‘input floors’. 
the input floors help to mitigate the intrinsic ‘model risk’ in the model-based approaches 
as result, for example, of uncertainty regarding banks’ parameter estimates. also, they 
limit the capital relief that a credit institution may obtain from using internal models for 
regulatory capital estimation. the Committee set the input floors at relatively low levels 
in order to avoid the possibility of pushing banks with very low risk exposures towards 
15 the “slotting approach” is a regulatory approach whereby banks have to assign different standardised rws to 
loans, classifying the loans into different categories which are defined uniformly for all banks based on the 
underlying credit risk of the loans. thus, in essence, it works like a hybrid between a standardised approach 
and internal models. 
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a).
 sehcaorppa elbaliava :III lesaB sehcaorppa elbaliava :II lesaBExposure/oiloftroP
Large and mid-sized corporates 
(consolidated revenues > €500m) A-IRB, F-IRB, SA F-IRB, SA
Banks and other financial institucions A-IRB, F-IRB, SA F-IRB, SA
ASsehcaorppa BRI suoiraVseitiuqE
AS ,gnittols ,BRI-F ,BRI-AAS ,gnittols ,BRI-F ,BRI-Agnidnel desilaicepS
NEW SCOPE OF APPROACHES AVAILABLE BY CREDIT-RISK PORTFOLIO TABLE 3
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riskier counterparties and to avoid affecting excessively the risk sensitivity of the 
framework.
Under Basel II, there was a single PD floor of 3 bp which applies at exposure level. In the 
revised framework this floor has been increased to 5 bp.16 in addition, the existing 10% 
floor for residential mortgages which was set at the sub-segment level was replaced by a 
lGd floor of 5% applicable at the exposure level. this level of granularity works most 
effectively at tackling abnormally low input values since it does not allow offsetting among 
exposures (i.e. using an input floor at the sub-segment level with a weighted average could 
result in a non-binding floor just because the shortage of exposures with very low estimated 
lGds can be offset against the surplus of exposures with higher estimated lGds). Table 4 
includes a summary of the minimum parameter values introduced in the revised irB 
framework.17 
in general, the calibration of lGd input floors for loans secured by different types of 
collateral was reduced in comparison with the floors proposed in the 2016 Consultative 
document [BCBs (2016b)]. it is worth keeping in mind that the aim of these input floors is 
to serve as a backstop for low-risk exposures.
exposures guaranteed by sovereigns are exempt from input floors. the exemption should 
only apply to the part of the exposure that is guaranteed. the current treatment of sovereign 
exposures has been reviewed separately (see section 6). 
annex 1 describes some additional enhancements that were introduced in the irB 
approach. 
16 except for qualifying revolving retail exposure (Qrre) revolvers, for which it has been set at 1% based on 
supervisory experience that has identified revolvers as showing a significantly higher default rate than 
transactors. for this purpose, transactor has been defined.
17 CCf floors will also apply for the proposed narrow types of facilities that may still be modelled under the airB.
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a).
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in the Basel ii framework, banks that adopt the irB approach were required to do so for all 
material asset classes, subject to a roll-out period (i.e. a plan for a sequential implementation 
of the irB approach to the different asset classes within a bank). the purpose of this 
requirement was to reduce the chances that banks may embark on ‘cherry-picking’ by 
switching between standardised and irB approaches in order to lower the resulting capital 
requirements. 
in an attempt to curb the negative effects, the Committee modified the roll-out requirement 
so that it is only mandatory on a portfolio basis. that is, banks would not be required to 
roll out the irB across all material exposures within the bank. instead, the irB approach 
will have to be rolled out to all exposures within each of the banks’ portfolios. for 
example, if banks are using the irB for their corporate exposures they would be required 
to roll out the irB across all their material corporate exposures. Banks would not be 
required to roll out the irB for their retail or bank exposures, even if such exposures are 
material.
more generally, a jurisdiction which does not implement some or all of the internal modelled 
approaches, but instead uses exclusively the standardised approaches available in the 
framework, will still be compliant with the Basel standards. 
a final point to note is that the Basel ii framework applies a scaling factor of 1.06 to the 
rwas determined by the irB approach to credit risk. this scaling factor increases the capital 
requirements resulting from the use of the IRB approaches by 6 pp. Given the enhancements 
to the irB framework and the introduction of an aggregate output floor (see section 5), the 
Committee has decided to remove the scaling factor of 1.06.
the Basel ii framework introduced a menu of approaches to operational risk, including 
both standardised approaches and internal models. the financial crisis revealed some 
weaknesses in the simpler approaches, including capital requirements that were not 
conservative enough for some banks. this resulted in a review of the simpler approaches 
and a new standardised approach (nsa) which was introduced in 2014. 
the BCBs also developed a sophisticated quantitative model based on banks’ internal 
loss data, known as operational risk Capital at risk (opCar) [see BCBs (2014b)]. this 
model was not proposed as a possible approach for banks to meet their minimum capital 
requirements for operational risk. the opCar model was used by the Committee to help 
choose some suitable proxy indicators of banks’ capital needs for operational risk and 
to calibrate the coefficients applied to the selected indicators. as a result of this work, in 
2016 the BCBs consulted on withdrawing the option of using internal models for the 
estimation of regulatory capital (which was allowed for banks using the advanced 
measurement approach, ama), proposing instead a single standardised approach 
known as the standardised measurement approach (sma) [BCBs (2016e)]. the sma 
was developed to better align the operational risk framework with the results obtained 
by the opCar model and to provide a workable standardised alternative for banks using 
the ama.
the reforms of Basel iii agreed in december 2017 included a revised version of the sma 
with various important changes with respect to the 2016 Consultative document.
the capital requirement under the sma is determined as a function of two indicators: the 
business indicator (Bi) and the loss component (lC). Based on the findings from the use of 
scope of application of irB 
approaches and scaling factor
3 operational Risk  
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the opCar model, both indicators were considered to be associated with the level of 
operational risk faced by banks. the sma combines the Bi and the lC using an ad hoc 
function named the internal loss multiplier (ilm) (see  scheme 2).
the Bi is a composite measure of banks’ net income. it is meant to work as a proxy of 
the banks’ business volume: higher business volume is considered to be associated with 
higher operational risk losses. more specifically, the Bi is the sum of three components: 
a) the interest, leases and dividend component (i.e. it includes different sources of banks’ 
income/expenses associated with typical credit intermediation activities such as granting 
loans and taking deposits); b) the services component (i.e. it reflects income/expenses 
received/paid for providing/receiving advice and services, plus other operating income/
expenses), and c) the financial component (i.e. it includes net profits or losses on the 
banks’ trading activities in both their banking and trading book).18
the resulting Bi is then multiplied by a set of three marginal coefficients (12%, 15%, 18%) 
each one corresponds to a different tranche of the banks’ BI (€0  to €1  billion; €1 to 
€30 billion; more than €30billion, respectively). Each of the consecutive tranches of the BI 
is multiplied by its corresponding marginal coefficient, the total sum of which is named the 
business indicator component (BiC).19 the BiC was designed analogously to a progressive 
taxation system to avoid cliff-edge effects between buckets. the increasing coefficients 
were justified based on empirical analysis. as result of additional analysis performed 
18 the Bi includes an adjustment to the first component (the interest part of the interest, leases and dividend) to 
limit the influence of net interest income (mostly affecting banks’ business models with high interest rate 
margins). ‘High margin’ banks are defined as those with a net interest margin (nim) larger than 2.25%, where 
the nim is calculated as the net interest income (interest income minus interest expense) divided by the interest-
earning assets. 
19 For example, the BIC for banks with a BI of € 40 billion is 6.27. This is the sum of the following terms: 1st BI 
tranche: 1 x 0.12 = 0.12; 2nd Bi tranche: (30 – 1) x 0.15 = 4.35; and 3rd Bi tranche: (40 – 30) x 0.18 = 1.8.
THE STANDARDISED MEASUREMENT APPROACH (SMA) SCHEME 2
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
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during the consultation period, the final structure decided for the BiC had fewer buckets 
and lower marginal coefficients than the structure proposed in the 2016 Consultative 
document [BCBs (2016e)].
the lC is set as a multiple of banks’ average historical annual losses over the 
preceding ten years (the assumption is that the banks’ historical losses are informative 
of the possibility of incurring similar operational risks in the future). that is, the 
average historical annual losses over the past ten years are multiplied by a given 
number (the ‘loss multiplier’) that has been set equal to 15. this design of the lC 
implies that historical losses in any given year would have an effect on the banks’ 
capital requirements during the subsequent ten years. this was expected to create 
incentives for banks to improve their operational risk management since doing so 
would gradually result in a lower track record of losses being captured by the 
database used for the lC calculations (and thus having an impact on capital 
requirements). 
in contrast to the final design proposed for the lC where there is only one factor determining 
the lC contribution to the capital requirement (the average historical annual losses over 
the past ten years), the lC structure proposed in the 2016 Cd included a three-factor 
structure. in that design, there was one multiplier applicable to the total average annual 
loss, one multiplier for the average annual loss only including loss events above €10 
million, and one for the average annual loss only including loss events above €100 million. 
this structure allowed the lC to differentiate between banks with different historical loss 
characteristics, for example banks with small but recurring losses and banks with large but 
infrequent losses.
Banks using the lC in their capital calculations should meet some minimum standards 
on loss data collection to ensure adequate data quality. Banks should also follow a 
series of criteria for the identification and treatment of the losses they include in the 
dataset to calculate their average annual losses. the minimum threshold for including a 
loss event in the dataset has been set at €20,000. this threshold may be raised at 
national discretion to €100,000 for banks with a BI greater than €1 billion (i.e. banks in 
the Bi buckets 2 and 3). the minimum threshold for losses was €10,000 in the 2016 Cd 
with the possibility of using a €20,000 threshold in some cases for banks moving for the 
first time to the sma. the changes introduced and the options available aim to allow 
more adequate coverage of relevant losses. for example, they help to reflect the fact 
that small and predictable recurring losses are usually embedded in banks’ internal 
business practices as part of their normal activity and, therefore, their effects are 
considered in banks’ pricing decisions.  
the sma combines the Bi and the lC using an ad-hoc function named the internal 
loss multiplier (ilm). the ilm is set as a function of the lC/BiC ratio and is concave 
(the ilm increases with the lC/BiC ratio but at a decreasing rate). the functional 
form of the ilm approved in december 2017 is as follows:
 ILM ln
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the ilm helps to smooth the effect of the lC on the resulting capital requirements and 
serves to scale them up or down depending on the relationship between the BiC and the 
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lC. where the BiC is greater than the lC, the ilm is also greater than one, which increases 
the resulting capital requirement (the rate of the increases in the capital requirement is 
decreasing due to the concave shape of the ilm). where the BiC is lower than the lC, the 
ilm is lower than one, which reduces the capital requirement. finally, where the BiC is 
equal to the lC, the ilm is equal to one and thus the capital requirement is only determined 
by the BiC.20
Compared with the ilm proposed in the 2016 Cd, the only change in its functional form is 
that it now includes a ‘dampening’ factor. this factor has been set at 0.8 and has been 
added to the ilm as an exponent to the lC/BiC ratio. the purpose of the dampening factor 
is to soften even further the potential effects that large losses may have on the resulting 
capital requirements.  
subject to national discretion, the ilm may be set equal to 1 for all banks in a given 
jurisdiction. that is, historical losses would not be used for the calculation of capital 
requirements under the revised pillar 1 framework for operational risk. as commented 
above, differences in banks’ business models may lead, for instance, to different risk 
profiles which are difficult to capture by the one-factor structure in the lC. these 
differences in banks’ risk profiles may also have an effect on the way that the lC and 
the BiC interact within the ilm formula. also, the use of historical losses may make 
the lC more prone to exposure to cyclical effects. to obviate or mitigate these and 
other possible cases where national authorities may consider it appropriate, the 
latter may decide to exercise such discretion. in that event, banks would still be 
subject to the disclosure requirements provided for in the standards for historical 
losses. 
the last step to calculating the minimum capital requirement for operational risk consists 
in multiplying the BiC by the ilm:
 Minimum capital requirement = BIC ILM ×  [2]
in addition to the requirements explained above, the agreed framework comprises a series 
of disclosure templates requiring information on banks’ operational risk management 
frameworks, their historical losses, their BiC and subcomponents thereof, and the resulting 
minimum operational risk capital requirements. 
in addition to the reforms described in the previous sections, the Committee has agreed to 
review two additional areas of the framework: capital requirements related to Credit 
valuation adjustment (Cva) and the leverage ratio framework. 
Cva refers to the adjustment made to the fair value of a derivative transaction to consider 
the current value of expected future losses caused by  counterparty default. therefore, 
Cva reflects the market value of counterparty default risk, which depends both on 
counterparties’ credit spread and market risk factors driving the actual exposure. the 
Cva adjustments have a direct impact on the p&l account. as such, Cva has an impact 
on banks’ results and also on regulatory capital ratios. Given the impact of these 
20 For banks in the first BI bucket (BI ≤ €1 billion), the historical losses do not enter into the capital calculation. This 
means that the ilm is set to be equal to 1 and, therefore, the resulting capital requirement is the resulting BiC 
(in this case 12%*Bi). However, banks in the first bucket may still be allowed to uses losses in the calculation 
of the capital requirements at national discretion.
4 other reforms
4.1  minimum Capital 
reQuirements  
for Cva risk
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adjustments on banks’ results during the last financial crisis and that this risk was not 
captured by the Basel ii framework, the Committee decided to introduce Cva capital 
charges in the Basel iii framework. the capital charges were set to address variability in 
Cva for derivative transactions not transacted directly with a qualified central counterparty 
and securities financing transactions fair-valued for accounting purposes.21
the revisions to the Cva framework endorsed in december 2017 used the same range of 
measures as in the rest of the standards. first, the possibility of using internal modelling 
approaches for Cva was removed, thus contributing to the effort to improve comparability 
and simplicity of the framework. at present under the revised framework banks can use 
two alternative methods: the basic approach (Ba-Cva), which simplifies the calculation of 
capital requirements and sensitivities.22 or they can use the standardised approach (sa-
Cva), for which supervisory approval is required. further, a materiality threshold was 
established with the aim of simplifying capital requirements for banks with a reduced 
notional amount of non-centrally cleared derivatives (≤€100 billion). In those cases, the 
Cva capital required would be equal to 100% of banks’ capital requirements for 
counterparty credit risk. 
second, the risk-sensitivity of the standardised approach was enhanced. in particular, the 
revised framework considers changes to the exposure component derived from market 
risk factors, which is an important driver of Cva risk, and also hedges associated with 
these risk factors. these proposals try to align capital requirements with the underlying 
economic risk, which creates hedging incentives for banks.
third, the changes introduced by the Committee sought to ensure consistency between 
the Cva framework and the revised market risk framework.23 this was particularly 
necessary given that the accounting Cva is fair-valued and depends on the same 
underlying risk factors as those positions held in the trading book. therefore, capital 
charges in both frameworks should be closely linked for example, the sa-Cva is based 
on sensitivities to market risk factors while the Ba-Cva is benchmarked to the sa-Cva.
together with the rest of the reforms, the Basel Committee announced in december 2017 
the introduction of a leverage ratio buffer for Global systemically important Banks (G-siBs). 
this new buffer is in addition to the 3% minimum tier 1 leverage ratio requirement 
established by the Committee in January 2016 [GHos (2106)].
the objective of this additional requirement based on the existing minimum leverage 
ratio was two-fold. the first objective was to constrain the build-up of leverage in the 
banking sector. the last financial crisis made it clear that leverage in the banking systems 
was excessive. as a result of market pressures when the crisis unfolded, banks were 
forced to make sharp adjustments to deleverage their balance sheets creating further 
pressure on asset prices, all of which resulted in a significant credit contraction in the 
real economy. to help avoid these dynamics, the minimum leverage ratio establishes a 
maximum level of leverage that banks can assume. this complements the risk-based 
capital ratios. the leverage ratio can contribute to preventing excessive leverage which 
21 during the financial crisis, banks faced important losses on their otC derivatives portfolios which were mostly 
explained by Cva adjustments to the fair value of these transactions [BCBs (2015a)].
22 two versions of the Ba-Cva could be applied by banks: an “abridged” version designed to simplify the 
implementation of this method for less sophisticated banks that do not hedge Cva; and a “full version” that 
recognised counterparty spread hedges.
23 fundamental review of the trading Book [BCBs (2016a)]. 
4.2  CHanGes related to  
tHe leveraGe ratio
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may not be fully captured in the risk-based capital ratios, for example as a result of large 
concentrations in low risk-weighted exposures. the second objective was to serve as a 
general backstop to risk-based requirements (see section 5). the leverage ratio is a simple 
and non-risk based measure which helps to safeguard against model risk and measurement 
error.
Given that the existing surcharges on G-siBs were solely founded on risk-based capital 
ratios, the Committee considered it necessary to ensure consistency between the 
incentives created by the leverage ratio and the G-siBs framework. to this end, it was 
decided that the leverage-based G-siB buffer should be met with tier 1 capital24 and its 
calibration set as the result of multiplying the G-siB risk-based buffer by a scalar factor of 
50%.25 this scalar factor corresponds to the rwa density of a neutral bank between risk-
based capital requirements and the t1 leverage ratio. in particular, the leverage ratio could 
be expressed as follows:
 
Leverageratio
Tier capital
Exposure
   
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 [3]
it can be seen from this equation that considering the existing minimum t1 risk-based 
capital requirement of 6% and the 3% t1 leverage ratio requirement, the neutral rwa 
density would be equal to 50% (3% lr = 6% t1 ratio × 50% density). in other words, 
banks whose rwa density equals 50% (defined as rwa divided by the leverage exposure) 
would require the same amount of capital under both capital requirements. to ensure that 
this relationship is maintained for the G-siB buffers (i.e. the same neutral rwa density 
applies considering additional requirements established for G-siBs), the Basel Committee 
introduced an additional leverage ratio into the G-siB buffer requirement. for example, a 
G-siB with a risk-based buffer requirement of 2% would be subject to an additional 
leverage ratio buffer of 1% (= 50% * 2%).26
the design of the leverage-based G-siB buffer and the consequences of breaching it are 
the same as for the risk-based buffer. in particular, the buffer is divided into five ranges and 
capital distribution restrictions will depend on the position of the banks’ leverage ratio 
within them. this implies that automatic distribution restrictions to capital distribution for 
G-siBs will now depend both on their Cet1 risk-based ratio and their t1 leverage ratio. 
for example, a G-siB which meets its minimum Cet1 risk-based requirements plus 
buffers (4.5% minimum; 2.5% capital conservation buffer; and the G-siB buffer) but does 
not meet its t1 leverage ratio requirements (3% plus its leverage ratio buffer) will be subject 
to the distribution constraints referenced to the leverage ratio. when it fails to meet both, 
the higher restriction would apply.
as an illustration, Table 5 shows the minimum conservation requirements for the Cet1 
risk-based ratio and the t1 leverage ratio for banks with a 1% risk-based G-siB buffer.
24 while rwa-based G-siB buffers should be met with Cet1, leverage ratio G-siB requirements are based on 
tier 1 (though given that for the minimum lr of 3% there is no limit to at1 capital, the effect of having 
imposed a leverage ratio G-siB buffer would have been minimal).
25 reviewed and published annually by the BCBs and financial stability Board (fsB).  
26 nevertheless, the leverage ratio framework does not take into consideration the other capital buffers or pillar 2 
requirements, which decrease the neutral rwa-density (and therefore make the leverage ratio requirement less 
binding). 
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in addition to the G-siB buffer, the Committee has also revised some aspects of the design 
of the denominator of the leverage ratio. some of these changes sought to improve the 
consistency between the leverage ratio framework and other Basel standards. for 
example, the measurement of derivative transactions was adapted to consider the new 
standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposures (sa-CCr), albeit 
with some modifications to ensure that the principle of not recognising collateral, 
guarantees or other credit risk mitigation techniques are taken into account.27 additionally, 
the treatment of off-balance sheet exposures was also modified to ensure consistency 
with the standardised approach for credit risk (described in section 2.1).
finally, the Committee has introduced a national discretion to exempt central bank reserves 
from the leverage exposure measure on a temporary basis under exceptional 
macroeconomic circumstances. Jurisdictions that apply this discretion should recalibrate 
accordingly the minimum requirement to ensure robustness of the requirement in relation 
to the rest of the balance sheet. this exemption was introduced to address a possible 
problem created by the leverage ratio in some circumstances where, for example, the 
central bank applies an expansionary policy. Banks’ balance sheets would increase as a 
result of using these facilities and leverage ratios would fall. in this context there are 
incentives for banks to divest other assets to compensate for the reduction in their leverage 
ratios or even to limit the use of central bank facilities. 
the Basel Committee has introduced a new output floor whereby rwas are bound to a 
minimum of 72.5% of total rwas calculated using the available standardised approaches 
in the Basel framework. 
this new floor substitutes that included in the Basel ii standards. the Basel ii floor was 
found to be implemented inconsistently by jurisdictions and it was based on capital 
requirements under Basel i (instead of the revised standardised approaches, which are 
more risk-sensitive). the original objective of the Basel ii floor was also different to that of 
the new floor. its purpose was to limit a rapid fall in capital requirements as a result of the 
introduction of internal models. to avoid this, it was originally devised as a transitional and 
decreasing floor. nevertheless, the Basel Committee finally decided to keep the floor in 
place after the transitional period (beyond end-2009).28
the Committee introduced the new aggregate output floor by first clarifying the design 
and workings of the measure. as commented above, the spirit of the new floor was similar 
27 the sa-CCr was published in march 2014, after the publication of the initial leverage ratio framework. 
28 BCBs press release, 13 July 2009, https://www.bis.org/press/p090713.htm. 
5  Backstop  
measures:  
the output floor
CET1 risk-weighted ratio           Tier 1 leverage ratio           
Minimum capital conservation 
ratios (expressed as
a percentage of earnings)
%001%521.3 - 3%573.5 - 5.4
%08%52.3 - 521.3 >%52.6 - 573.5 >
%06%573.3 - 52.3 >%521.7 - 52.6 >
%04%05.3 - 573.3 >%8 - 521.7 >
%0%05.3>%0.8 >
EXAMPLE OF MINIMUM CAPITAL CONSERVATION RATIOS TABLE 5
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a).
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to that of the Basel ii floor, but their design and objectives are different. while the output 
floor also seeks to ensure a minimum level of capital, its objectives are to improve the 
credibility of capital ratios and support their comparability, therefore contributing to ensure 
a level playing field between banks using internal models and banks applying the 
standardised approaches. regarding their design, the main difference with the Basel ii 
floor is that the new output floor is based on the available standardised approaches in the 
Basel framework. this makes the measure more risk-sensitive (as explained above, the 
Basel ii floor was based on the Basel i framework, which was significantly less risk sensitive 
than the revised standardised approaches).29 
Capital requirements under the new output floor are calculated as the higher of:
– Current total rwa calculated under the approaches approved by supervisors 
(for example, using the irB for credit risk exposures or the internal model 
approach (ima) for market risk exposures); and 
– 72.5% of the total rwa calculated using only standardised approaches (for 
example, the sa for credit risk exposure or the standardised approach for 
market risk). 
the simplified example in table 6 helps to illustrate how the output floor would work in 
practice:
as the output floor is calculated at the aggregate level (i.e. by totalling all the different 
types of risks covered in the Basel standards) it permits offsetting between different 
portfolios and risks in a given bank. this implies that the ‘effective output floor’ (the floor 
that would apply to only the part of the rwas calculated using internal models) would be 
lower, the higher the amount of rwa calculated using standardised approaches. following 
on from the example above, this means that although the aggregate output floor is 
calibrated at 72.5%, the effective output floor relative to the portion calculated using 
internal models would be 65.95%.30 
29 additionally, the Basel ii floor included an adjustment related to the recognition of general provisions in tier 2 
for exposures under the sa. the new output floor does not apply any adjustment related to the different 
treatment of provisions under the irB (where total provisions are compared with the estimated expected loss 
and the shortfall (excess) should be deducted (added) to Cet1 (tier 2 with some limits)) and the sa (where 
rwas are calculated using exposures net of specific provisions while general provisions can be recognised in 
tier 2 with some limits). 
30 the effective output floor is the implicit calibration that would ensue if the floor were established only relative to 
rwa estimated using internal models (i.e. excluding rwas actually calculated using standardised approaches). 
Pre-floor RWAs Standardised RWAs
72.5% of
standardised RWAs
52.560904 ksir tiderC
8.0050803serusopxe BRI   
52.70101 serusopxe AS    
90.242)AMI( ksir tekraM
52.70101)AMS( ksir lanoitarepO
40.5740125 AWR latoT
SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE OF THE OUTPUT FLOOR TABLE 6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 34
an alternative design could had been a more granular output floor (e.g. by risk, portfolio or 
even exposure). However, this alternative would have required a different calibration to 
consider the specificities of each segment and may have further constrained the risk-
sensitivity of the framework.
the last financial crisis showed that market participants had lost confidence in the risk-
based capital ratios, particularly when calculated using internal models.31 as a 
consequence, investors’ focus changed towards alternative metrics not based on rwas 
such as simple leverage ratios. the variability in rwas densities and therefore in capital 
requirements was indeed significant. for example, trucharte et al. (2015) found that the 
use of the irB approach was more intense in those situations where there was a higher 
reduction of rwa density with respect to the sa. these authors also found significant 
variation across countries in terms of their use of the irB approaches and capital savings. 
several observers argued that these differences in rwa densities could not always be 
explained by underlying risk factors. in response, and as mentioned in section 2, the Basel 
Committee performed analyses on the variability of calculations of risk exposures. it was 
found that an important part of the dispersion in rwas was not driven either by the 
underlying risk or by differences in supervisory practices [BCBs (2013b)]. 
though various policy measures focused on internal models were adopted (e.g. changes 
to the irB approaches for credit risk, revision of the internal models for market risk, or 
prohibition of the internal models for Cva or operational risk), the introduction of backstop 
measures to rwas was still warranted. rwas calculations can be affected by model risk, 
gaming risk and measurement error. Consequently, insofar as internal models were used 
to compute capital requirements, some additional measures were needed to enhance the 
robustness of the resulting capital requirements. specifically, the three back-stop measures 
included in the revised Basel framework complement each other as result of their design 
and characteristics:
– Input floors: as explained in section 2, these floors determine the minimum level 
for models’ parameters such as pds and lGds. Conceptually, these floors help 
the supervisory review of the internal models and ensure a minimum level of 
capital even for exposures with very low risk levels. 
– Output floor: it limits the capital savings that banks can obtain as a result of using 
internal models. this floor also addresses problems related to higher risk exposures 
for which input floors are generally not binding. these higher risk exposures could 
also be affected by undue rwa variability and model risk. at the same time, it 
contributes to strengthening the comparability of the risk-based capital 
requirements. 
– Leverage ratio: it ensures a minimum level of capital for all exposures. it works 
as a complement to the output floor given that the leverage ratio – unlike the 
output floor – also serves as a backstop against standardised approaches. 
the effective output floor (x%) is obtained by making the impact of the output floor on the banks’ rwas (75.4 – 
52) equal to the difference between the floor applied only to rwas using internal models (x% * rwas obtained 
using standardised approaches for those portfolios for which the bank actually uses internal models) and the 
rwas using internal models (x% * 84 – 32).
31 for example, a survey conducted by Barclays in 2012 found there was quite general lack of confidence in the 
capital ratios as result of the disparities observed in risk weights [Financial Times (2012)]. 
5.1  rationale  
and interaCtions  
of tHe output floor 
witH otHer measures
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the latter could also suffer model risk as it may be inherited in the regulatory 
methodology that was used to calibrate the standardised approaches. 
separately, the output floor applies to rwas and therefore ensures that the 
backstop affects all the levels of prudential requirements established under 
the Basel framework (minimum requirements, buffers and even total loss-
absorbing capacity requirements).
overall, these measures try to ensure a balance between the comparability and consistency 
of capital requirements across banks (e.g. needed to restore confidence in the risk-based 
capital ratios) while also retaining enough risk-sensitivity in the framework (e.g. needed to 
align capital requirements with the underlying risk of the exposures and to create the right 
incentives for banks). 
the Committee sought to avoid a significant increase in the overall capital requirements as 
a result of post-crisis reforms [GHos (2016)]. in this respect, the results from the quantitative 
impact assessment (Qis) performed by the Committee showed that changes in capital 
ratios were rather insignificant on average [BCBs (2017c)]. additionally, the Committee 
established an implementation date and transitional arrangements to ensure that banks 
will have enough time to adapt to the new standards. 
the reforms approved are expected to enter fully into force from 2022 with the exception 
of the output floor, which will be phased in gradually by 2027 (scheme 3). additionally, the 
Committee introduced national discretion for capping the increase in rwas resulting from 
the application of the floor at 25% of total rwas. regarding disclosure requirements, 
banks should start publishing their rwas using standardised approaches in 2022, which 
would permit the market to calculate the impact of the output floor under full implementation. 
in any case, jurisdictions are free to bring forward implementation or to not apply the 
phase-in provided for the output floor. 
6  Implementation  
and disclosures
BASEL III POST-CRISIS REFORMS. IMPLEMENTATION DATES AND TRANSITIONAL AGREEMENTS SCHEME 3
National discretion:
25% cap on increase in RWAs due to the output floor
End of the output 
floor phase-in
70%
65%
60%
55%
72.5%Start
 of the output 
floor phase-in
50%
2018
Minimum LR 3% 
(existing exposure 
definition)
2022
All reforms
(SA, IRB, CVA, 
OpRisk, FRTB, LR 
revised exposure, LR 
G-SIB buffer)
20272024 2025 20262023
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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in addition, the Committee also decided to delay the implementation date of the new 
market risk framework (fundamental review of the trading Book - frtB) until 2022. this 
was in acknowledgement of certain implementation challenges as a result of the complexity 
of the revised standards. this deferral gave the Committee time to finalise some revisions 
to the frtB related to the relative calibration of the standardised and internal model 
approaches. 
in January 2015 and in tandem with some of the ongoing work at the time in relation to 
the post-crisis reforms to Basel iii, the BCBs set up a high-level working group to review 
the existing regulatory treatment of sovereign risk in a careful, holistic and gradual 
manner [see BCBs (2015b)]. to follow such an approach was pertinent due to the special 
characteristics and multiple roles of sovereign debt and its interactions with other 
economic policies. as a result of this work, in december 2017, at the same time as the 
agreed reforms to the Basel iii framework were announced, the Basel Committee 
published a discussion paper (dp) on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures 
[BCBs (2017b)]. 
the dp began by describing the main characteristics of sovereign risk. some of these 
characteristics are related to the frequency and impact of sovereign crises. the empirical 
evidence in the dp suggests that while the impact of a sovereign crisis may vary significantly 
across countries and in terms of the type of crisis (for example whether it coincides or not 
with a banking crisis), the frequency of sovereign debt defaults has been considerably 
lower than in other asset classes. in addition, the effect of the interconnections between 
banks and sovereign exposures often depends on a number of factors, including 
macroeconomic variables and the size of banks’ sovereign debt holdings ahead of a 
shock. Banks’ sovereign exposures may work either as a shock absorber or amplifier 
depending on these factors.
sovereign debt also performs various roles in the banking system and financial markets, 
and has important interactions with economic policies. for example, sovereign debt is 
commonly used as a source of stable collateral for financial markets and the broad 
economy. sovereign debt also contributes to making the operationalisation of monetary 
policy (since central banks’ market operations typically involve government debt) and it 
affects the transmission of monetary policy through financial markets (through the working 
of sovereign debt repo markets and by serving as a reference to the pricing of financial 
assets). finally, sovereign debt interacts directly with fiscal policy. it can contribute, for 
instance, to the implementation of stabilising fiscal policy strategies during the different 
phases of the economic cycle.
against this background, sovereign exposures are treated more favourably than other type 
of exposures in different parts of the Basel regulatory framework. whereas sovereign 
exposures are included in the leverage ratio requirements, they receive preferential 
treatment in the credit and market risk frameworks, and they are excluded from the large 
exposures framework. in addition, domestic sovereign exposures can be included without 
limits in the stock of high-quality liquidity assets (HQla) as part of the liquidity standards 
and – depending on supervisory discretion – they can be exempted from the application of 
haircuts to their value.   
as the dp concludes, at this stage the Basel Committee has not reached a consensus to 
make any changes to the current treatment of sovereign exposures. nonetheless, the dp 
outlines potential ideas related to revising the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures 
7 Sovereign risk
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that have been discussed as part of the Committee’s review of the current treatment. the 
ideas outlined in the dp include the following:
– revisions to the definition of sovereign exposures (e.g. further specification of 
the definitions of exposures to central banks, central governments and other 
sovereign entities);
– revisions to the risk weighted framework (e.g. potential removal of the irB 
approach for sovereign exposures and mandatory positive standardised risk 
weights);
– adoption of marginal risk weight add-ons to mitigate concentration risks (i.e. 
increasing risk weights allocated according to different levels of banks’ 
sovereign exposures concentration calculated in term of their Tier  1 capital 
resources);
– revisions to the credit risk mitigation framework (e.g. removal of national 
discretion to apply a zero haircut to sovereign repo-style transactions);
– additional pillar 2 (e.g. enhanced guidance on monitoring, stress testing and 
supervisory responses to sovereign risk), and
– additional pillar 3 disclosures (e.g. richer and more granular information for 
market participants by including jurisdictional, currency and accounting 
classification breakdowns).
the post-crisis reforms completed the main revisions to the Basel regulatory framework 
which were initiated in 2010. while in the first phase of the reforms the focus was on the 
numerator of the risk-based capital ratio (capital), the second phase – the finalisation of 
Basel iii post-crisis reforms – focused on its denominator (rwas). the reforms sought to 
address several shortcomings identified in the framework and help enhance the resilience 
of the banking system. the finalisation of Basel iii post-crisis reforms, in particular, aimed 
to restore the credibility of rwas, therefore contributing to rebuilding market participants’ 
confidence in the risk-based capital ratios.  
with the post-crisis reforms now finalised, the Committee’s focus is increasingly turning 
towards ensuring proper implementation of the reforms, the evaluation of their effects, and 
the assessment of emerging risks and vulnerabilities in the banking system. 
in the short and medium term, the Committee will focus its efforts on four main areas. first, 
it will work on completing the existing policy initiatives such as the revisions to the market 
risk framework, the regulatory treatment of accounting provisions, and the remaining 
disclosure requirements. 
second, the focus will be on monitoring emerging risks and evaluating the impact of post-
crisis reforms – including whether the reforms are working effectively to reduce excessive 
variability of rwas. these efforts should be seen together with the financial stability 
Board’s initiative regarding the impact analysis of G20 post-crisis reforms. 
third, the Committee will focus on promoting strong and consistent supervision of banks. 
the plan includes the development of possible improvements to the supervisory tools and 
8 Next steps 
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techniques, such as, for example stress-testing practices, and the assessment of best 
practices in relation to new emerging risks.
finally, following the commitment announced by the GHos in december 2017, the 
Committee will dedicate its efforts to ensure a full, timely and consistent implementation 
of the reforms. 
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Annex 1: Additional enhancements to the IRB approach
the Committee agreed on various additional enhancements to the irB approaches to 
further reduce unwarranted rwa variability. these include adjustments to the supervisory 
parameters in the firB approach such as the following: i) for unsecured exposures, the 
lGd parameter was reduced from 45% to 40% for exposures to non-financial corporates, 
and ii) for exposures secured by non-financial collateral, the haircuts that apply to the 
collateral were increased and the lGd parameters were reduced. table a1 shows the new 
lGd and haircuts applicable to secured exposures under firB
although the proposed floors for physical and other collateral are lower than in the current 
firB framework, this is justified given that the haircuts applied to non-financial collateral 
have been increased on the grounds of empirical evidence gathered by supervisors during 
the loan recovery process. 32  in any case, it was considered that haircuts of 40% should 
still provide sufficient incentives for banks to take collateral.
when considering options for reducing unwarranted rwa variation in ead estimates, the 
revised framework set forth a combination of greater use of supervisory CCf estimates 
together with additional constraints on banks’ estimate practices where the possibility of 
CCf modelling is retained.
as mentioned in the body of the paper, issues from low default are often more common in 
certain portfolio segments of banks. to ensure that ead-related rwa differences primarily 
reflect differences in underlying risk, CCf estimates are only allowed for those portfolios 
that are not considered low default portfolios for the purpose of lGd estimates. likewise, 
the use of supervisory CCfs for non-revolving commitments is required.
another issue that contributes to rwa variability among banks – and within the same 
bank – is the use of different time horizons for the estimates. Currently, there are three 
methods available: fixed-horizon, multiple horizon and cohort estimate approaches. the 
Committees found merits in reducing associated rwa differences by setting a uniform 
fixed 12-month horizon approach.
in addition, under the new airB framework maturity should be based on the expiry date of 
the facility. this allows setting the maturity as the maximum residual time that a borrower 
32 a haircut is the fixed value that is to be used under the firB to determine the proportion of the exposure that 
is secured (and subject to the relevant prescribed and secured lGd) and the proportion that is unsecured.
Type of collateral           LGD           Haircut           
d in the enimreted sA
%0laretalloc laicnanif elbigilE
comprehensive approach (SA) 
%04%02selbaviecer elbigilE
Eligible residential/commercial
real estate
%04%02
%04%52laretalloc lacisyhp elbigile rehtO
LGD AND COLLATERAL HAIRCUTS APPLICABLE ON SECURED EXPOSURES 
UNDER FIRB 
TABLE A.1
SOURCE: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017a).
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is allowed to fully discharge its contractual obligations under the terms of the loan 
agreement.
in keeping with the efforts to identify areas where the complexity of the framework could 
be reduced and/or comparability improved, the Committee has also introduced changes 
to the Crm framework. for example, to better align the requirements for eligible guarantees 
for all banks, it has been specified what unconditional means in terms of guarantees. 
under the airB, the option to recognise conditional guarantees has been retained but 
solely in the case of guarantees that only cover the loss remaining after banks have first 
pursued the original obligor for payment and have completed the workout process.
another measure to simplify the Crm framework for the airB and to reduce divergences 
in capital requirements, was to remove the recognition of second-to-default and nth-to-
default credit derivatives. the main reasons are doubts about the effectiveness of this type 
of credit protection and the complexity involved in modelling the correlation between the 
different assets in the basket. in the same vein, the double default treatment has been 
removed because of its complexity.33
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